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Hedge funds have grown rapidly in the last two decades, from managing assets 
worth approximately $600 billion in 2003 to over $3 trillion in 2017. As hedge funds 
themselves have grown, so too have concerns about their involvement with publicly 
traded companies and their effect on various stakeholders and the economy. Although 
Critics claim that hedge fund activism creates a short-term focus, shifting funds out of 
expansion and research and development and into distributions to shareholders, 
proponents argue that hedge fund activism helps boards overcome management 
incompetence and counter passive investors. Academic research is mixed on the long-
term effects of hedge fund activism and few studies have examined the relationship 
between hedge fund ownership and the external audit process. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether hedge fund ownership affects 
auditor-client contracting. Specifically, the study examines the relationships between 
hedge fund ownership and (1) audit fees, (2) audit lag, (3) issuance of going concern 
opinions, and (4) auditor resignation.  
This research is an archival study. The sample consists of publicly listed firms 




observations. The results show that hedge fund ownership (both the number of hedge 
fund owners and the percentage owned) has a highly significant, negative relationship 
with audit lag. This finding indicates auditors perceive clients with hedge fund owners to 
decrease audit risk. Results also show that hedge funds increase audit fees. In additional 
analysis, however, this positive association is shown to be driven by increased audit 
effort, not the presence of hedge funds. These results suggest that hedge fund owners 
decrease perceived audit risk and are willing to pay higher audit fees for higher quality 
audits.  
No significant association was found between issuance of a first going concern 
opinion or auditor turnover and hedge fund ownership. These results should be 
interesting for politicians, regulators, auditors, investors, and for future research. 
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 The purpose of this study is to examine whether hedge fund ownership of publicly 
traded companies affects auditor-client contracting. The growth of hedge funds has been 
rapid. For example, hedge funds managed approximately $600 billion of assets in 2003 
(SEC, 2003). By 2017, hedge funds managed more than $3 trillion in assets worldwide 
(Herbst-Bayliss, 2017; Williamson, 2018). As hedge fund asset management has risen 
over the last twenty years (Cheffins & Armour, 2011; Gillan & Starks, 2007), so have the 
concerns regarding the effects of hedge funds on publicly traded companies, 
stakeholders, and the U. S. economy (Coffee Jr. & Palia, 2016).   
The main concern expressed by critics is that hedge funds create a short-term 
focus. That is, they focus on shifting funds out of long-term spending and into 
distributions to shareholders (Monga, Benoit, & Francis, 2015; Sharfman, 2015).  For 
example, then U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton described hedge funds as “cut and run 
shareholders” during a speech at New York University (Sorkin, 2015). Before that, the 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York cautioned that hedge funds “present 
a source of potential risk to the financial system” in a 2004 speech at the National 
Conference on the Securities Industry (Geithner, 2004). 
Not everyone, however, feels that hedge fund involvement is detrimental to other 




contends that hedge funds play a vital role in the market. The author makes the case that 
activists push management and the Board of Directors (Board) into taking strategic 
actions in underperforming firms and counter the “apathy” of passive investors (Liou, 
2018).  Hedge fund interventions that incorporate Board seats can help decrease a firm’s 
agency problems and the rise of hedge fund activism has spurred institutions into more 
active roles in their investments (Christie, 2018).  
Academic research also disputes the contention that hedge fund activism 
promotes short-term gains at the expense of long-term value. Studies by Bebchuk, Brav, 
and Jiang (2015) and Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz, and Rao (2014) found no evidence that 
the positive returns from hedge fund activism reversed themselves in the five years after 
intervention. Sharfman (2015) contends that hedge funds actually create long-term value 
by providing Boards with an alternate point of view from management to consider when 
making decisions. Hedge fund intervention can also improve operating performance 
(Clifford, 2008) and improve debt restructuring in financially distressed firms (Lim, 
2015).  
The debate about the value of hedge fund ownership on their investees and other 
stakeholders (such as employees, customers, suppliers, and the government (Freeman, 
1984)), is clearly illustrated by the following quote: 
Activist hedge funds, writes The Economist in its cover story of February 7, 2015, 
are “a breath of fresh air” and “good for the public company.” They offer firms a 
“new lease on life.” They are “a force for good.” They are “capitalism’s unlikely 







Denning’s (2015) article, as quoted above, goes on to describe the seven reasons 
hedge fund activists are not “saviors.” Broadly, he argues that hedge funds have a short-
term focus and their goal is to create value for shareholders only (not creating value for 
customers and the economy). The result of their intervention is managers adopt a short-
term time horizon (reducing staff and benefits to staff, reducing spending on research and 
development, and increasing debt) to increase share price and take management attention 
away from company operations to defensive strategies to fend off hedge fund activism. 
They frequently induce share buybacks in the companies they own and, finally, hedge 
funds contribute to the promotion of financial gains over providing goods and services. 
Hedge funds tend to be “financial engineers” who lack the interest and understanding of 
the “real task of management” (innovation and creating value for customers).  
This view of hedge fund activism is shared by Martin Lipton, a founding partner 
of a law firm specializing in topics that affect corporate strategy and policy: 
 “the attacks and the efforts by companies to adopt short-term strategies to avoid 
becoming a target [of hedge funds] have had very serious adverse effects on the 
companies, their long-term shareholders, and the American economy” (Lipton, 
2013).  
 
Voicing her concerns, corporate law scholar Lynn Stout (2012) wrote that 
acceding to activist shareholders’ demands: 
 “causes corporate managers to focus myopically on short-term earnings reports at 
the expense of long-term performance; discourages investment and innovation; 
harms employees, customers, and communities; and causes companies to indulge 
in reckless, sociopathic, and socially irresponsible behaviors” (p. 7).  
Some lawmakers were concerned enough about hedge funds to introduce a Senate 





In addition to the studies already mentioned, academic research on hedge fund 
ownership provides evidence of positive effects of hedge fund ownership and firm 
outcomes.  Specifically, research provides evidence of a positive relationship between 
hedge fund ownership and abnormal returns (Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2009; 
Karpoff, Malatesta, & Walkling, 1996; Strickland, Wiles, & Zenner, 1996; Wahal, 1996) 
and operating performance (Becht et al., 2009; Del Guercio, Seery, & Woidtke, 2008; 
Gillan & Starks, 2007). Although research overall has shown that activism has a negative 
effect on managers, it can produce benefits to shareholders. For example, it is associated 
with decreased CEO pay and increased CEO turnover, but activism can also lead to gains 
in productivity, divestiture of underperforming assets, and positive excess stock returns 
(e.g. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, & Thomas, 2008; Edmans & Holderness, 2017; Klein & Zur, 
2009) as well as increasing upper management and boards of directors effectiveness 
(Bebchuk, 2013; Boyson & Mooradian, 2011). Activism also results in improved 
corporate tax efficiency, increased accounting conservatism and the threat of hedge fund 
activism may cause managers to increase voluntary disclosures (e.g., Bourveau & 
Schoenfeld, 2017; Cheng, Huang, & Li, 2015; Cheng, Huang, Yinghua Li, & Stanfield, 
2012). 
One area of research, however, that has remained largely unexplored is the effect 
of hedge fund ownership on the audit engagement.1 The few studies that have examined 
the relationship between hedge funds and auditors have focused on the effects of auditing 
                                                          
1 Most studies on shareholders and external auditors have focused on the auditor ratification process, 
looking at against and abstaining votes as a measure of satisfaction with the auditor. See, as examples, Dao, 
Mishra, & Raghunandan, 2008; Dao, Raghunandan, & Rama, 2012; Hermanson, Krishnan, & Zhongxia, 





on the hedge funds themselves.2  For example, Liang (2003) found a significant, positive 
difference in reporting quality between audited versus non-audited hedge funds, 
emphasizing the importance of quality audits. Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield (2011) 
found that hedge funds that revised previously reported financial statements significantly 
underperformed hedge funds that never revised, suggesting that audited hedge funds are 
beneficial to investors. Similarly, Jylha’s (2012) study on misreporting found that hedge 
funds managed by a registered investment advisor and hedge funds that were members of 
a large group of funds (two groups more likely to be audited) were less likely to overstate 
their performance. 
Using a sample of 30,047 firm-year observations for the years 2005-2017, I 
examine the association between hedge fund ownership and audit outcomes; specifically, 
audit lag, audit fees, auditor turnover, and the issuance of going concern opinions. The 
results of the study show that hedge fund ownership is significantly, negatively 
associated with audit lag and significantly, positively associated with audit fees. These 
results appear to contradict each other as the decrease in audit lag supports the viewpoint 
that auditors consider hedge fund ownership to decrease engagement risk, while the 
increase in audit fees supports the viewpoint that hedge fund ownership increases 
engagement risk. Taken together, hedge fund ownership is associated with a shorter audit 
completion time, but higher audit fees. In an additional analysis, I investigated this 
contradiction by testing the interaction between hedge funds and audit effort on audit 
fees. The results of that analysis showed that the presence of hedge funds was not 
responsible for the increase in audit fees, rather that is was the interaction between hedge 
                                                          
2 In a concurrent paper, Guo et al. (2018) investigate the relation between specific categories of activist 





funds and audit effort. This suggests that hedge funds are willing to pay more for audits 
to achieve higher audit quality. Overall, the results of these two tests indicate that 
auditors consider hedge fund ownership of clients decreases their perceived engagement 
risk. 
Results of the examination of hedge fund ownership and going concern opinions 
and auditor turnover yielded no statistically significant results. Likewise, an additional 
analysis of hedge funds and the issuance of material weaknesses in internal controls over 
financial reporting also yielded no statistically significant results.  
Audits are an integral part of the financial reporting process. They help mitigate 
the agency problems between investors and managers by reducing information 
asymmetry levels between these parties and, thus, are an important component of 
financial reporting quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, 
Shefchik, & Velury, 2013). This study helps fill the gap in the literature by increasing 
information about hedge funds and auditors through their relationship with the external 
audit process in companies owned by hedge funds.  
The results of this study could have implications for multiple interested parties. 
Politicians, regulators, corporate law experts, and business leaders concerned about the 
effects of hedge fund activism on publicly traded companies will be interested in the 
effects on the external audit process and, thereby, the financial reporting quality of 
publicly traded companies. Likewise, proponents of hedge fund involvement, the hedge 
fund managers themselves and other business leaders will be interested in the answer to 
the same question. For regulators, the U.S.  Securities Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 





shareholders and the external auditor, so this study may address some of their concerns.  
Finally, there is a growing body of academic research related to shareholder activism and 
hedge funds in particular. This study will answer Denes et al.’s (2017) call for more 
studies on the effects of hedge fund activism on non-financial stakeholders and will add 
to the academic discussion surrounding the growing the presence of activist hedge funds 
in the market. 
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature and proposes hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the research design that will be 
used to test the relationship between activists and audit quality and the data collection 
method for the proposed sample. Chapter 4 presents the results of hypothesis testing and 
an additional analysis. Chapter 5 colludes with a summary of the results, potential 










BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Shareholder Activism 
Shareholder activism in the United States can be traced back to 1942 when the 
SEC adopted a rule (the precursor to today’s rule 14a-8) that allowed shareholders to file 
proposals that could be put to a vote (Gillan & Starks, 2007).  Any shareholder can 
potentially be an activist shareholder. Activist shareholders can be defined as investors 
who, dissatisfied with the company’s performance, seek to bring about changes in the 
company through multiple measures including: voting against director nominations (Del 
Guercio et al., 2008), influencing top management through private discussions (Becht et 
al., 2009; Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998; Smith, 1996), and proxy filings at the 
company’s annual shareholders meeting (Denes et al., 2017).  
Until the 1970’s, activists were mostly individual investors or groups of 
individual shareholders that banded together to increase their power (Gillan & Starks, 
2007). A primary example of an investor group was the United Shareholders Association, 
founded by T. Boone Pickens, which operated from 1986 to 1993 and submitted over 163 
proposals to 50 target firms from 1991-1993 (Strickland et al., 1996). Institutional 
investors came to the forefront in the 1980’s, beginning with public pension funds. This 
mirrors the rise in ownership by institutions of publicly traded companies, which 





& Starks, 2007). Even more so than individuals, institutions can exert power over a 
firm’s management on many subjects (Brickley, Lease, & Smith Jr., 1988; Carleton et al., 
1998; Wahal, 1996). Institutional investors are powerful because they rely on shared 
information and proxy analyses, which allows them to concentrate their votes (Bethel & 
Gillan, 2002). As activists, these institutions tend to focus on corporate governance and 
environmental issues (Gifford, 2010) and their involvement has been found to increase 
shareholder wealth (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987; Opler & Sokobin, 1995). Institutions that 
are known to be activist investors include: pension funds (CalPERS (Smith, 1996) and 
TIAA-CREF (Carleton et al., 1998)), investment managers (Hermes UKFF (Becht et al., 
2009)), mutual funds, and hedge funds (Gillan & Starks, 2007). 
Goals and Outcomes of Shareholder Activism 
 
The aim of activist shareholders is to bring about substantial changes in the 
targeted companies (Becht et al., 2009) with an end goal of increasing shareholder value 
overall to make a profit (Sharfman, 2015). Such changes can include everything from 
encouraging management to sell underperforming assets or divisions or increase payouts 
to shareholders to replacing executives with others more inclined to implement the 
desired changes (Becht et al., 2009). Activist shareholders specifically push for CEO 
turnover (Benoit, 2017; Benoit & Lublin, 2014; Brav et al., 2008; Del Guercio et al., 
2008), lower CEO compensation (Ertimur, Ferri, & Muslu, 2011; Ertimur, Sletten, & 
Sunder, 2014), divestiture of assets (Bethel, Liebeskind, & Opler, 1998; Salvaterra, 
2017), separation of CEO and chair of the board of directors (Daily & Dalton, 1997), and, 





Board of director replacement (Benoit & Lublin, 2014; Berk & Whitten, 2017) is 
another outcome of shareholder activism. Replacing board members, however, does not 
always help activists achieve their goal of increasing firm value. Akyol et al. (2012) 
found that increased shareholder activism in the form of director nominations decreased 
shareholder wealth overall. Other studies on the nominations of directors by shareholders 
have yielded mixed results, with too much power in the hands of shareholders leading to 
decreased firm value (Larcker, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2011), while tighter restrictions on 
the shareholders allowed to nominate leading to positive results (Campbell, Campbell, 
Sirmon, Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012). Studies outside of director nominations have found 
that agency problems are mitigated by shareholder voting on control events and important 
items, but excessive voting on items by shareholders leads to inefficiencies (Easterbrook 
& Fischel, 1983; Pound, 1991).  
Because activists achieve their goal of substantial company change mostly 
through private negotiations, rather than proxy filings (Becht et al., 2009; Carleton et al., 
1998; Smith, 1996), they are able to avoid inefficiencies caused by excessive voting. The 
United Shareholders Association, for example, only used proxy filings when negotiations 
with management failed (Strickland et al., 1996) as the cost of bringing items to the 
proxy stage has an average estimated cost to the shareholder of $10.7 million per proxy 
contest (Gantchev, 2013). The benefits of activist proposals have been fairly low, only 
yielding abnormal positive returns around the announcement date of 0.36% (Renneboog 
& Szilagyi, 2011) to 1.31% (Cuñat, Gine, & Guadalupe, 2012). Private negotiations 





of negotiations of  0.98% (English, Smythe, & McNeil, 2004) to 1.86% (Wahal, 1996), 
making a proxy contest rarely worth the expense of fighting it.   
The long-term effects of activism have yielded mixed results. Smith (1996) found 
positive, long-term stock returns for the targets of CalPERS’ activism and Opler and 
Sokobin (1997) found the same results for the companies listed on the Council of 
Institutional Investors’ Focus List. In contrast, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and 
Prevost and Rao (2000) found no significant abnormal returns, either positive or negative, 
to targets of activist negotiations in the long-term. In terms of effects on the firms 
themselves, most research on activist shareholders has found no significant relationship 
between activists and the operating performance of their targets (Carleton et al., 1998; 
Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Karpoff et al., 1996; Strickland et al., 1996). One 
exception is Del Guercio et al.’s (2008) study on the effects of institutional investors and 
operating performance, which found increased return on assets in the three years 
following activist intervention. An analysis of shareholder activism over a 30 year period 
yielded two important pieces of information: activism on the whole has been more 
successful at attaining desired results in recent years and the type of activist is important 
to attaining those results (Denes et al., 2017). 
Hedge Fund Activism as a Special Case of Shareholder Activism 
 
A hedge fund is a type of activist investor that has risen to prominence in the last 
two decades (Cheffins & Armour, 2011). A hedge fund is an investment fund typically 
characterized by higher risk and uncertain investment strategies. Because unlike mutual 





investors3 are permitted to invest in hedge funds and they are prohibited by the SEC from 
advertising to the general public, although many of them are registered with the SEC4, 
allowing them to have a lower minimum investment and an unlimited number of 
investors (“Hedge Fund Definition,” n.d.). Mutual funds and pension funds are usually 
bound by their charters to not use leverage or derivative instruments. Hedge funds, in 
contrast, often use options and leverage to increase effective ownership in their targets 
(Hu & Black, 2007). Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds can also short securities (SEC, 
2013a).  
The beginnings of hedge fund activism can be traced back to the 1980’s when 
institutional investments in publicly traded companies began to rise and a few private 
investment funds began activist campaigns. By the 1990’s, hedge funds were becoming a 
part of the investment scene, but they were not as active as they are today (Cheffins & 
Armour, 2011). At the beginning of the 1990’s, the SEC reports that there were around 
300 hedge funds operating in the U.S. managing approximately $40 billion dollars in 
assets (approximately $70 billion adjusted for inflation), compared with the $1.6 trillion 
managed by mutual funds (SEC, 2003). In 2003, the number of hedge funds had grown to 
between 6,000 and 7,000, managing roughly $600-650 billion in assets (SEC, 2003) 
(approximately $800-865 billion adjusted for inflation) and by 2017 hedge funds were 
managing $3.2 trillion worldwide5 (Williamson, 2018). Hedge funds that engaged in 
                                                          
3 The SEC considers individuals with high net worth and/or high income to be accredited investors (SEC, 
2013b). 
4 Unregistered hedge funds are not subject to all the regulations that protect investors, including disclosure 
requirements, although they are subject to fraud regulations. Hedge fund managers managing more than 
$25 million in assets must file Form ADV with the SEC to become registered and file public reports (SEC, 
2013a). 
5 In general, hedge fund holdings have increased steadily since 2004, but fell after the 2008 Financial Crisis 





shareholder activism also increased during this period with $100 billion in assets ($121 
billion adjusted for inflation) being managed by activist funds in 2006 (Barr, 2006). 
Greenwood and Schor’s (2009) study on 13D filings announcing an intention to influence 
management and 5% ownership showed a similar trend. Only 10 such filings occurred in 
1994, eight of them by hedge funds, while 153 occurred in 2005, 141 of them filed by 
hedge funds. 
Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are not required to maintain high levels of 
diversification, nor are they required to maintain sufficient liquidity to allow withdrawals 
from their shareholders (Aragon, Ergun, Getmansky, & Girardi, 2017). In fact, hedge 
funds often require notice well in advance of any withdrawals as they tend to keep 
investor capital locked in investments for extended periods of time (Aragon, 2007; Bhide, 
1993; Coffee, 1991). The compensation structure for hedge fund managers is also 
different from that of mutual and pension funds. Managers of hedge funds typically 
receive a fee of 20% of their fund’s annualized returns, while mutual and pension fund 
managers are compensated in a less performance-driven manner. It makes sense then, that 
although the cost of activism is high, the potential payoff for hedge fund managers is also 
high, thereby compensating the managers for their increased risk and efforts (Clifford, 
2008). 
Because the compensation structure of hedge funds rewards managers for their 
performance, hedge funds engage in performance-driven activism. Performance-driven 
activism pushes for significant changes in the corporation’s operations in order to 
increase the market price of a company’s stock. This is in contrast to the non-





compensation and governance issues (Rose & Sharfman, 2014), although hedge funds 
can also engage in non-performance changes as part of their campaign of company 
changes (Cheffins & Armour, 2011).  
In addition to being performance-driven, hedge funds differ from mutual funds 
and pension funds in that they are offensive, rather than defensive (Cheffins & Armour, 
2011). When pension and mutual funds engage in performance-driven activism, it occurs 
only when the companies in which they are already invested begin to underperform or 
their shares begin to drop in the market (Kahan & Rock, 2007). Hedge funds, in contrast, 
seek out corporations that are already underperforming and purchase a significant number 
of shares (around five to ten percent of shares outstanding) with the aim of improving 
company performance (Cheffins & Armour, 2011). To this end, hedge funds actively 
campaign for changes that will increase the performance of their companies and the share 
price (Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008). 
Before pushing for changes, however, the activists must acquire shares in publicly 
traded companies. Certain characteristics are more attractive to activists and companies 
become targets of activism by underperforming or being undervalued in the market 
(Gillan & Starks, 2007; Strickland, Wiles, & Zenner, 1996; Wahal, 1996). The usual 
target of these activists is the poor performer (Becht et al., 2009; Gillan & Starks, 2007; 
Wahal, 1996), that is, companies underperforming in both their industry and the market 
in general (Strickland et al., 1996). These targeted companies also exhibit low insider 
ownership and high institutional ownership (Gillan & Starks, 2007). Companies can also 
be targeted due to poor governance structure (Gillan & Starks, 2007), such as the United 





shareholder input and plans not tying top management pay to firm performance 
(Strickland et al., 1996). 
Because the changes pushed by activists can be drastic, companies do not always 
wish to become targets of activism. One successful way that companies have made 
themselves less desirable to hedge funds is to increase the number of disclosures they 
make (Bourveau & Schoenfeld, 2017). As disclosures decrease information asymmetry 
and, therefore, allow the market to better price their shares, they become less of a target 
for activists, who prefer undervalued companies and information opaqueness (Bourveau 
& Schoenfeld, 2017). 
Results of Hedge Fund Activism 
Although research has shown that agency problems can be mitigated through 
concentrated ownership by reducing information asymmetries between management and 
shareholders and through increasing access to insider information (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), some have expressed concerns that shareholder involvement leads to opportunism, 
politicking, and use of influence by activist investors for personal gain (Adegbite, 
Amaeshi, & Amao, 2012).  
The most prevailing argument against the involvement of activist shareholders is 
that they induce short-termism in companies, which: 
“… refers to companies taking actions that are profitable in the short term but 
value-decreasing in the long term, such as increasing near-term earnings by 
cutting research that would pay off later on. Activist investors with short 
investment horizons, it is argued, seek actions that boost short-term stock price at 
the expense of long-term value and often succeed in pressuring companies to take 






This short-term approach, according to critics, leads companies to maximize earnings at 
the expense of research and development and capital investment (Lipton, 2013). As well 
as concerns over reductions in research and development, concerns have been voiced that 
hedge funds exhibit patterns of behavior that also include increased payouts to 
shareholders and leverage (Coffee Jr. & Palia, 2016). 
Despite the concerns expressed, academic research has found little evidence that 
hedge fund intervention promotes short-term gains at the expense of long-term value. 
Boyson and Mooradian (2011) found that hedge fund activism improves the long-term 
operating performance of targets and their short-term stock performance. These results 
were most dramatic in firms where hedge funds focused on changes in governance and 
reducing excess cash. In addition, hedge funds themselves benefitted from aggressive 
activism by performing better than hedge funds using less aggressive tactics. Target firms 
experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover (Brav et 
al., 2008) and hedge fund intervention leads to increases in leverage and improvement in 
value (Carrothers, 2017). 
Market reaction to hedge fund intervention is significant and positive around the 
date of the Schedule 13D filing and these significant positive returns continue into the 
subsequent year (Klein & Zur, 2009). The abnormal return around the announcement of 
activism is approximately seven percent, with no reversal during the subsequent year 
(Brav et al., 2008). Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015) found no evidence that activist 
interventions are followed by short-term gains in performance that come at the expense 
of long-term performance in the five years following intervention. They also find no 





abnormal returns in the long term nor the contention that the exit of the hedge fund is 
followed by abnormal long-term negative returns. 
Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz, and Rao (2014) also found no evidence in their study 
that target firms experienced a reversal of positive results during the five-year period 
following intervention. In addition, target firms that granted a Board seat to a hedge fund 
had positive abnormal returns during the five-year period following activist joining the 
target firm Board. Further, target firms increased return on assets (ROA) and other 
operating measures and market value relative to book value after intervention. Bushee 
(1998) did find, however, that institutions with high portfolio turnover were associated 
with lower spending on research and development, while long-term institutional investors 
were associated with increased spending on research and development. While no similar 
research exists on hedge funds, the short time horizon of hedge fund ownership (the 
average length of ownership is 20 months (Brav et al., 2008)) would put them in the same 
group as transient institutional investors. Bushee’s (1998) findings, however, only hold 
for institutions with high levels of ownership and hedge funds only average just over nine 
percent ownership (Coffee Jr. & Palia, 2016), so those finding might not be applicable to 
hedge funds. 
Cremers, Giambora, Seps, and Wang (2015), on the other hand, contests the 
results of studies where researchers have found that hedge funds create long-term value. 
Their research supports the idea that the improvements seen in targeted firms are the 
result of selection bias, that is, hedge funds target firms that are already underperforming. 
Using a matched-pair analysis of targets versus non-targets, they found that non-targets 





Sharfman (2015), however, contends that hedge funds do create long-term value 
by providing recommendations to the Board for improving managerial inefficiency and 
signaling that its executive management team may be making inefficient decisions. The 
Board is then able to review and question the direction management is taking the 
company, choosing which advice the company should take: management, hedge funds, or 
a combination of both. It is important to note here that hedge funds as activists frequently 
push for the separation of CEO and Board Chair (Daily & Dalton, 1997), increasing 
Board independence from management.  
Extant studies examine the effects of increased hedge fund ownership on target 
firms’ accounting quality. For example, Cheng, Huang, and Li (Cheng et al., 2015) found 
target firms exhibit increases in conditional accounting conservatism after hedge fund 
intervention. The increases are limited to circumstances in which hedge funds have 
relatively higher ownership and hold their investments for at least one year, allowing 
sufficient amount of time to exert their monitoring effects. Firms targeted by hedge funds 
earn higher excess stock returns and experience greater improvements in operating 
performance than firms targeted by the same hedge funds for passive purposes (Clifford, 
2008). Activist hedge funds can create value by enabling a higher probability of 
completing prepackaged restructurings, faster restructurings, and greater debt reduction 
in financially distressed firms (Lim, 2015). 
Hypotheses Development 
 Agency problems occur in corporations when the owners of the corporation, 
shareholders, are not the managers and so are not responsible for the daily operations of 





conflicting interests and, due to information asymmetry between managers and investors, 
this leads to conflict between the two groups (Eisenhardt, 1989). Due to these conflicting 
interests, the firm’s audit committee is responsible for hiring an independent third party 
(U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, 2002) to give an 
opinion on the financial statements and mitigate the effects of the agency problem 
(Simunic, 1984). The external audit process, therefore, is an important part of financial 
reporting quality and important to outside shareholders (DeFond & Zhang, 2014).  
Audit risk. 
 The audit process is not without risk to the external auditor. Prior literature 
identifies three risks auditors face for each engagement6 (DeFond, Lim, & Zang, 2016; 
Knechel & Vanstraelen, 2007). There is the risk that the auditor will issue an incorrect 
audit opinion, i.e., give an unqualified opinion on a set of financial statements that are 
materially misstated, known as audit risk. In addition to audit risk, auditors face client 
risk, i.e. the risk that the client will become insolvent, and thus the auditor could be 
entangled in the bankruptcy-related litigation which could have negative reputational 
effects on the auditor. The third risk faced by auditors is their own business or 
engagement risk, the risk that performing the audit will open the audit firm up to potential 
losses, either directly through litigation or indirectly through client loss from loss of 
reputation (DeFond et al., 2016). Even the largest accounting firms can be damaged from 
litigation or loss of reputation (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). In fact, the largest firms, the Big 
                                                          
6 PCAOB standards only identify audit risk to be the risk of giving an incorrect opinion on materially 
misstated financial statements, modeled as audit risk = inherent risk * control risk (PCAOB, 2016). 
Academic research, however, expands the concept of audit risk to include the risks to themselves faced by 





4, may be at the highest risk for loss of reputation because they have the highest 
reputation, and, therefore, the most to lose (DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993).  
To mitigate these risks, auditors employ various strategies to reduce the chances 
of litigation and reputational losses (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). Reputation is important to 
auditors because the loss of reputation results in the loss of clients (Barton, 2005; Chen & 
Jian, 2007; Jensen, 2006; J. Weber, Willenborg, & Zhang, 2008). An extreme example of 
the effect of reputation loss is the case of accounting firm Arthur Andersen. After the 
Enron fraud was revealed, most of its clients switched to a different accounting firm, 
almost all to another member of what we now call the Big 4 (Blouin, Grein, & Rountree, 
2007). Arthur Andersen also faced criminal and civil charges in regards to its actions in 
Enron’s accounting falsifications (Barton, 2005). 
 Although the case of Arthur Andersen is unique, every accounting firm faces the 
potential loss of clients through loss of reputation and loss of money through litigation. 
Litigation against accounting firms has risen steadily since the 1980’s (Giroux & Cassell, 
2011) with a dramatic increase in lawsuits after SOX implementation (Udeh & Epps, 
2013). In addition to litigation, audit firms of publicly traded companies risk fines and 
sanctions, including deregistration, from the PCAOB (Huber, 2013). Nagy’s (2014) study 
shows that accounting firms disclosed by the PCAOB as having low quality control lose a 
significant amount of market share. Deloitte’s 2007 sanctions from its 2003 audit of 
Ligand Pharmaceuticals cost the accounting firm $1,000,000 in fines (PCAOB, 2007) and 
damaged its ability to retain clients and attract new ones (Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 





market share decline in Deloitte’s audit clients after its 2007 sanctions (Dee, Lulseged, & 
Zhang, 2011).  
The perceived effects of hedge fund ownership on audit engagement risk 
 Large shareholders in general, and blockholders, defined as outside owners with 
five percent or more ownership (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987), in particular, are associated 
with pressures to manage earnings, which increases auditor risk (Abbott, Parker, & 
Peters, 2006). Hedge funds’ average ownership in targeted companies is just over nine 
percent (Coffee Jr. & Palia, 2016), making the majority of them blockholders. Because 
there is an association between block ownership and earnings management, I expect 
block ownership by hedge funds to increase audit engagement risk. 
When companies are targeted by activist shareholders, the market takes notice as 
demonstrated by the increase in abnormal returns around the date of announcement 
(Becht et al., 2009; Strickland et al., 1996; Wahal, 1996). In addition, hedge fund 
activism is under scrutiny from U.S. senators (Baldwin, 2017; Michaels, 2017) and others 
concerned about the short-term nature of this kind of activism and the effects on the U.S. 
economy through publicly traded companies (Cheffins & Armour, 2011; Kahan & Rock, 
2007). This increased scrutiny from analysts and regulators when hedge funds buy blocks 
in companies may increase audit engagement risk because the auditors want to protect 
their reputation7. 
Not all characteristics of hedge fund ownership, however, may increase auditor 
engagement risk. While hedge funds are known for pressuring management and the board 
                                                          
7 Notably, hedge funds themselves sued Arthur Andersen over investment losses related to the Enron 





of directors into making drastic changes to the company (Becht et al., 2009), such as 
divesting underperforming assets (Salvaterra, 2017) or selling the company itself (Becht 
et al., 2009; Berk & Whitten, 2017), ownership of publicly traded companies by hedge 
funds increases conditional conservatism when hedge fund ownership is relatively high 
compared to the average and when the hedge funds remain owners for at least one year 
(Cheng et al., 2015). Audit clients associated with more conservative accounting are 
viewed as less risky clients by auditors (DeFond et al., 2016) as measured by lower audit 
fees, fewer going concern opinions, and fewer auditor resignations. If higher hedge fund 
ownership increases accounting conservatism, I expect auditor engagement risk to 
decrease in the presence of block ownership by hedge funds. 
 Lack of trust in management integrity also affects auditor engagement risk. When 
auditors perceive that management integrity is below normal levels, they assess higher 
engagement risk and respond accordingly (Beaulieu, 2001; Bedard & Johnstone, 2004). 
Auditors perceive audit engagement risk to be lower when trust in management is higher, 
such as when social capital is high (Jha & Chen, 2015). Hedge fund intervention 
increases CEO turnover (Brav et al., 2008), CFO turnover (Cheng et al., 2015), lowers 
CEO compensation (Ertimur et al., 2011), and increases board independence by 
separating the board chair and CEO (Daily & Dalton, 1997), which increase oversight in 
regards to upper management. Studies suggest that shareholders in general, and those 
owning 5% or more of a company’s stock in particular, can restrain managers and aid in 
effective control of the corporation by its owners (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), thus 
mitigating agency problems. Hedge fund ownership could, therefore, increase auditor 





 Auditors use their clients’ overall financial condition to assess engagement risk 
(Pratt & Stice, 1994). Although the targets of hedge funds are underperformers (Gillan & 
Starks, 2007), prior research provides evidence that hedge fund activism is associated 
with higher operating performance (Brav et al., 2008; Denes et al., 2017), improvements 
in return on assets (Clifford, 2008), and faster restructuring and greater debt reduction in 
financially distressed firms (Lim, 2015) after targeting. Given that hedge fund 
intervention improves the financial condition of targeted firms, I expect a decrease in 
auditor engagement risk. 
Auditor response to risk. 
If hedge fund ownership of clients affects engagement risk, there should be an 
effect on the strategies auditors use to mitigate said risk.  The first way that auditors may 
respond to engagement risk is to increase audit effort.  Auditors may increase audit effort 
in order to reduce the likelihood of undetected errors (Hillegeist, 1999; Lobo & Zhao, 
2013) and thus reduce audit engagement risk. I use audit report lag as a proxy for audit 
effort because prior research suggests that audit report lags are related to the amount of 
work performed in the audit engagement (Knechel & Payne, 2001; Knechel, Rouse, & 
Schelleman, 2009).  
If hedge funds induce a short-term focus and higher scrutiny from regulators, 
politicians, and analysts which increases audit engagement risk, I expect a positive 
relation between audit report lag and hedge fund ownership. However, if hedge fund 
ownership acts to increase conservatism, ensure management integrity, and improve the 





expect a negative relation between audit report lag and hedge fund ownership. Given the 
competing arguments presented, I present my first hypothesis in null form: 
H1: There is no association between audit report lag and hedge fund ownership. 
The next strategy that auditors may use to mitigate risk is in audit pricing. The 
seminal work by Simunic (1980) models audit fees as a function of effort and risk. If 
higher audit effort does not reduce engagement risk to acceptable levels, the auditor may 
charge a risk premium in order to pass some of the risk on to the client (Bedard & 
Johnstone, 2004; Bell, Landsman, & Shackelford, 2001; Morgan & Stocken, 1998; Pratt 
& Stice, 1994). Thus, if clients with higher hedge fund ownership impose more risk, I 
expect hedge fund ownership to be associated with higher fees. As mentioned previously, 
however, hedge fund ownership may impose lower audit risk by decreasing auditor 
business risk through damage to reputation or litigation through increases to accounting 
conservatism and management integrity. Therefore, I present my second hypothesis in 
null form: 
H2: There is no association between audit fees paid to external auditors and 
hedge fund ownership. 
The third strategy auditors can employ to limit engagement risk is to decrease the 
threshold for issuing a going concern opinion (GCO). Studies have found that issuing 
GCOs to financially distressed clients lowers auditor litigation risk and settlements 
imposed from litigation (Fargher & Jiang, 2008). It also lowers the risk of audit failure, 
from the point of view of public opinion, thereby keeping auditor reputation intact 





hinder long term performance, then I expect a positive relationship between hedge fund 
ownership and the issuance of a GCO. However, if hedge fund ownership increases the 
probability and speed of restructuring, increases debt reduction in financially distressed 
firms (Lim, 2015) and improves firm performance (Boyson & Mooradian, 2011), there 
will be a corresponding decrease in GCOs issued to financially distressed clients owned 
by hedge funds. Therefore, I posit the following hypothesis in null form: 
H3: There is no association between the issuance of a GCO and hedge fund 
ownership. 
The final strategy that can be employed by auditors to mitigate engagement risk is 
to resign from the engagement. Auditors resign from clients when litigation risk is too 
high or if there is a mismatch between the auditor and the client (Shu, 2000). Further, 
Ghosh and Tang (2015) found that auditors consider more than just litigation risk when 
deciding to resign from a client. They found that client business risk and audit risk were 
also taken into consideration by external auditors when deciding to retain an audit client. 
Therefore, if hedge fund ownership of clients decreases business, litigation, or audit risk, 
I expect to see fewer auditor changes.  
The choice to stay, however, is not just the purview of the external auditor. Given 
that hedge fund ownership can influence the Board by replacing members with related 
parties (Benoit, 2017; Berk & Whitten, 2017), the decision to keep or replace the current 
auditor is affected through influence on the audit committee (Giroux & Cassell, 2011) 
and management, who still have an effect on auditor selection after SOX implementation 





 With the potential of hedge funds to influence auditor retention through Board 
replacement and influence over management and the potential for auditors to view hedge 
fund ownership as affecting engagement risk, I propose the following non-directional 
hypothesis: 






RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
Empirical Models 
Hedge fund ownership. 
To test my hypotheses, I estimate OLS regressions in which the main right-hand 
side variable of interest is hedge fund ownership of publicly traded companies at t-1 
(where t is the balance sheet date). I measure the level of hedge fund ownership in 
targeted companies in two different ways. First, HF_OWNED is defined as the 
percentage of outstanding shares owned by hedge fund activists (Agrawal & Mandelker, 
1990; Bushee, 1998; Farrar & Girton, 1981) at the time t-1. Second, HF_NUM is 
measured as the total number of hedge funds with block ownership in the audited firm at 
the time t-1 (Gavin, 2012).  Consistent with previous research, I have defined a block 
shareholder as an outside investor owning 5% or more of the company (Holderness & 
Sheehan, 1985; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987; Mikkelson & Ruback, 1985). The definitions of 






Table   1 
 Variable Definitions 
Variable Name  Variable Definition 
      
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
AUDIT_FEES  Natural log of audit fees paid by firm at time t 
LAG  
Time elapsed between the balance sheet date and the 
signature date of the audit report  
FIRSTGCO  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm received its first 
going concern opinion form its auditor this fiscal year, 
otherwise zero 
TURNOVER  
Indicator variable set to one the firm changed auditors 
since the previous audit report, otherwise zero 
MATWEAK  
Indicator variable set to 1 if the firm has a reported 
material weakness in time t 
Panel B: Test Variables 
HF_OWNED  
Percentage of outstanding shares owned by hedge fund 
activists at the time t-1 
HF_NUM  
Total number of hedge funds with block ownership in the 
audited firm at the time t-1 
   
Panel C: Control Variables 
AGE  
The number of years the firm has been in the Compustat 
database 
AGGLOSS  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm incurs an aggregate 
loss across years t-1 and t, otherwise zero 
LAG  
Time elapsed between the balance sheet date and the date 
of the audit report at time t-1 
BIG4  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm's auditor was a 
member of the "Big4" accounting firms, otherwise zero 
BUSSEG  
Natural log of one plus the number of the firm's business 
segments at the end of the fiscal year 
BUSY  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm's fiscal year ends in 





  Table 1-Cont’d 
CASH  
Cash and cash equivalents as a percentage of total assets at 
t-1 
CFVOL  
Standard deviation of operating cash flows divided by total 
assets from fiscal year t-5 to t-1. 
DISCOPS  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm reported 
discontinued operations for the fiscal year, otherwise, zero 
EXTRA  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm reported an 
extraordinary item for the fiscal year, otherwise zero 
FILE404  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm filed a SOX report, 
otherwise zero 
FOREIGN  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm has foreign 
operations, otherwise zero 
GEOSEG  
Natural log of one plus the number of firm's geographic 
segments at the end of the fiscal year 
GROWTH  Firm's growth rate for sales 
INST_OWNED  
Percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional 
investors at time t-1 
INVESTMENT  
Firm's total investment securities (including both short and 
long-term as well as cash and cash equivalents) divided by 
its total assets 
LEVERAGE  Firm's total liabilities divided by total assets 
LIQUIDITY  Firm's current assets divided by its current liabilities 
LOSS  
Indicator variable set to one if firm's net income for the 
fiscal year was negative, otherwise zero 
MATWEAK  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm received a SOX404 
internal control weakness opinion from its auditor, 
otherwise zero 
MERGER  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm had merger or 





  Table 1-Cont’d 
MISTATE  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm's current financial 
statement is restated in a later period, otherwise zero 
NEW_FINANCE  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm issued new debt or 
equity in the subsequent fiscal year, otherwise zero 
OCF  Firm's operating cash flow divided by total assets 
PRIORWEAK  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm had a reported 
material weakness in internal controls in the previous year, 
otherwise zero 
RECINV  
Sum of firm's receivables and inventory divided by total 
assets at firm year-end 
RESTATE  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm announced a 
financial restatement during the fiscal year, otherwise zero 
RESTRUCTURE  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm had restructuring 
activities during the fiscal year, otherwise zero 
ROA  Firm's net income divided by total assets 
SIZE  Natural log of firm's total assets 
SPECIAL  
Indicator variable set to one if the firm reported a special 
item for the fiscal year, otherwise zero 
STOCK_ 
RETURN 
 Firm's stock return for the current fiscal year 
TURNOVER  
Indicator variable set to one the firm changed auditors 
since the previous audit report, otherwise zero 
ZSCORE  Firm's bankruptcy score based on Altman (1968) 
ΔLEVERAGE  Change in firm leverage from t-1 to year t 
YEAR  Dummy variable for each year 







Audit fees and lag. 
 To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, I estimate the following OLS regressions:  
AUDIT_FEESt or LAGt = β0 + β1(HF_OWNEDt-1 or HF_NUMt-1) +β2SIZEt-1 + 
β3LEVERAGEt-1 + β4RECINVt-1+ β5ROAt-1+ β6LOSSt-1 + β7GEOSEGt-1 + 
β8BUSSEGt-1 + β9CFVOLt-1+ β10FOREIGNt-1 + β11MERGERt-1 + 
β12RESTRUCTUREt-1 + β13DISCOPSt-1 + β14EXTRAt-1 + β15SPECIALt-1 + 
β16BIG4t-1 + β17 BUSYt-1 + β18MATWEAKt-1 + β19RESTATEt-1 + β20MISTATEt-
1+ β21TURNOVERt-1+ YEAR and INDUSTRY DUMMIES + εit                 (1) 
The dependent variable in the regression equation 1 is Lag (H1) or Fees (H2). 
AUDIT_FEES is measured as the natural log of audit fees for the fiscal year and LAG is 
measured as the time elapsed between the balance sheet date and the date of the audit 
report per Audit Analytics (Ashton, Willingham, & Elliott, 1987). A positive (negative) 
β1 will indicate that hedge fund ownership is associated with higher (lower) 
AUDIT_FEES/LAG. To control for common time and industry variation I also include 
industry and year fixed effects in the regressions. The variables of interest are HF_NUM 
and HF_OWNED and are measured as previously described. 
Control variables are informed from prior literature, particularly Hay et al.’s 
(2006) meta-analyses of audit fee literature, which includes controls for size, leverage, 
profitability, auditor size, and client complexity, and prior research on audit fees (Beck & 
Mauldin, 2014; Sharma, Tanyi, & Litt, 2017; Stewart, Kent, & Routledge, 2016). All 





I control for SIZE, which is the largest determinant of audit fees (Hay et al., 2006) 
and is expected to have a positive relationship (Simunic, 1980). For LAG, however, SIZE 
is expected to have a negative relationship as larger companies have better internal 
control structures and more access to resources (Abernathy, Barnes, Stefaniak, and 
Weisbarth, 2017). SIZE is measured as the natural log of the firm's total assets. It is 
expected that a more complex client will be more difficult to audit and require more time 
and fees. Complexity is proxied in this study by GEOSEG, BUSSEG, and FOREIGN. 
GEOSEG is measured as the natural log plus one of the number of firm's geographic 
segments at the end of the fiscal year. BUSSEG is the natural log plus one of the number 
of the firm's business segments at the end of the fiscal year. FOREIGN is an indicator 
variable set to one if the firm has foreign operations, otherwise zero. I expect a positive 
association between complexity measures and audit fees/lag. 
Profitability is a measure of financial risk to auditors. LEVERAGE is the firm's 
total liabilities divided by total assets. LOSS is an indicator variable set to one if firm's 
net income for the fiscal year was negative, otherwise zero.  LEVERAGE, LOSS, and 
SRVOL are all expected to increase financial risk, so are expected to have a positive 
relationship with audit fees and lag. ROA is measured as the firm's net income divided by 
total assets. CFVOL is the standard deviation of operating cash flows divided by total 
assets from fiscal year t-5 to t-1. Higher ROA decreases financial risk, so is expected to 
have a negative relationship with audit fees and lag, while CFVOL increases financial 
risk and is expected to have a positive relationship. 
 Certain accounts are considered to be inherently riskier than others and require 





inventory. RECINV is the sum of firm's receivables and inventory divided by total assets 
at firm year-end and is expected to increase audit fees and lag. Additional reporting items 
will also require extra work on the part of the auditor. EXTRA is an indicator variable set 
to one if the firm reported an extraordinary item for the fiscal year, otherwise zero. 
SPECIAL is an indicator variable set to one if the firm reported a special item for the 
fiscal year, otherwise zero. 
Changes in the client itself or its operations are also expected to increase fees and 
lag. MERGER is an indicator variable set to one if the firm had merger or acquisition 
activities during the fiscal year, otherwise zero. RESTRUCTURE is an indicator variable 
set to one if the firm had restructuring activities during the fiscal year, otherwise zero. 
DISCOPS will be an indicator variable set to one if the firm reported discontinued 
operations for the fiscal year, otherwise zero.  
The quality of the audit firm  is expected to be associated with higher fees and 
members of the BIG 4 accounting firms are expected to produce the highest quality audits 
(DeAngelo, 1981), however, it is expected to have a negative association with audit lag 
because those firms have more resources and larger, more experienced staff (Abernathy 
et al., 2017). BIG4 is an indicator variable set to one if the firm's auditor was a member 
of the "Big4" accounting firms, otherwise zero. A change in auditors is also expected to 
increase fees and lag due to the need for increased audit procedures for the new auditor. 
TURNOVER is an indicator variable set to one the firm changed auditors since the 
previous audit report, otherwise zero. 
Lack of effective internal controls over financial reporting are expected to create 





variable set to one if the firm received a SOX 404 internal control weakness opinion from 
its auditor, otherwise zero, and is expected to increase audit fees. Restatements from prior 
years or misstatements are also expected increase audit fees and lag as they are expected 
to increase auditor effort. RESTATE is an indicator variable set to one if the firm 
announced a financial restatement during the fiscal year, otherwise zero. MISTATE is an 
indicator variable set to one if the firm's current financial statement is restated in a later 
period, otherwise zero.  
Many companies in the U.S. have the same fiscal year-end creating a busy season 
for auditors. An audit conducted during the busy season is expected to have a positive 
association with audit fees due to overtime required by auditors, but a negative 
association with lag. BUSY is an indicator variable set to one if the firm's fiscal year ends 
in December, otherwise zero.  
Going concern opinions. 
 To test Hypothesis 3, that hedge fund ownership affects the rate going concern 
opinions are issues, the following model adapted from DeFond and Zhang (2014) is used: 
FIRSTGCO = β0 + β1(HF_OWNEDt-1 or HF_NUMt-1) + β2SIZEt-1 + β3AGEt-1 + β4BIG4t-
1 + β5LEVERAGEt-1+ β6ΔLEVERAGEt + β7ZSCOREt-1 + β8OCFt-1 + β9LAGt-1 + 
β10LIQUIDITYt-1 + β11LOSSt-1 + β12STOCK_RETURNt + β13GROWTHt + 
β14INVESTMENTt + β15NEW_FINANCEt-1 + YEAR and INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES + εit       (2) 
Where FIRSTGCO is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the corporation received a 





measured as previously described. A positive (negative) β1 will indicate that hedge fund 
ownership increases (decreases) FIRSTGCO. I also include industry and year fixed 
effects in the regressions. 
Consistent with prior research, control variables for going concern opinions 
include measurements of growth and financial health of the firm (Carson et al., 2013a). 
All control variables will be measured at t-1, unless stated otherwise.  
Less profitable companies have been found to be more likely to receive a GCO. 
ΔLEVERAGE is measured as the change in firm leverage from t-1 to year t and is 
expected to have a positive relationship with the issuance of a GCO.  LEVERAGE and 
LOSS are expected to have a positive relationship with FIRSTGCO. OCF is the firm's 
operating cash flow divided by total assets. LIQUIDITY is measured as the firm's current 
assets divided by its current liabilities. STOCK_RETURN is the firm's stock return for 
the current fiscal year. All three measurements, OCF, LIQUIDITY, and 
STOCK_RETURN, are expected to have an inverse relationship with FIRSTGCO. 
Likelihood of bankruptcy has also been shown to affect the issuance of a GCO and is 
measured here as ZSCORE.  ZSCORE will be the firm's bankruptcy score based on 
Altman (1968) and is expected to have a negative relation with GCO. GROWTH is the 
firm's growth rate for sales. INVESTMENT is measured as the firm's total investment 
securities (including both short and long-term as well as cash and cash equivalents) 
divided by its total assets. GROWTH and INVESTMENT are both expected to have a 
negative relationship with FIRSTGCO. NEW_FINANCE is an indicator variable set to 
one if the firm issued new debt or equity in the subsequent fiscal year, otherwise zero, 





Larger and older firms are less likely to receive a GCO, so SIZE and AGE are 
expected to have a negative relationship with FIRSTGCO. AGE is the number of years 
the firm has been in the Compustat database. Clients of auditors that are members of one 
of the Big 4 accounting firms are less likely to receive a GCO as they tend to be in better 
financial condition, so BIG4 is expected to have a negative relationship with FIRSTGCO. 
The longer it takes an auditor to issue an opinion, however, the more likely it is that a 
GCO will be issued, so LAG is expected to be positively associated with FIRSTGCO. 
All other variables will be measured as previously described.  
Auditor turnover. 
 Finally, I measure response to risk for the audit firm for Hypothesis 4 using the 
variable of auditor change. The model for auditor turnover is a modified version of 
equation 1 and is adapted from Landsman et al.’s (2009) and Kim and Park’s (2014) 
studies on auditor switching: 
TURNOVERt = β0 + β1(HF_OWNEDt-1 or HF_NUMt-1) +β2SIZEt-1 + β3LEVERAGEt-1 + 
β4RECINVt-1+ β5ROAt-1+ β6LOSSt-1 + β7GEOSEGt-1 + β8BUSSEGt-1 + 
β9CFVOLt-1+ β10FOREIGNt-1 + β11MERGERt-1 + β12RESTRUCTUREt-1 + 
β13DISCOPSt-1 + β14EXTRAt-1 + β15SPECIALt-1 + β16BIG4t-1 + β17 BUSYt-1 + 
β18MATWEAKt-1 + β19RESTATEt-1 + β20MISTATEt-1+ YEAR and INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES + εit                     (3) 
I also include industry and year fixed effects in the regressions. TURNOVER is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm changed auditors during the year. The variables 





positive (negative) β1 will indicate that hedge fund ownership increases (decreases) 
TURNOVER.  
The costs of changing auditors is higher for larger clients (DeAngelo, 1981), so 
SIZE is expected to be negatively associated with auditor turnover. Clients of Big 4 
accounting firms are also expected to turn over less often, so BIG4 is expected to be 
negatively associated with TURNOVER.  
Profitable companies pose less financial risk to the auditor (Bedard & Johnstone, 
2004). I expect firms with high ROA to be negatively associated with auditor change and 
high LEVERAGE and LOSS to be positively associated. Firms are more likely to change 
auditors after mergers or acquisitions if the merged firm has a different auditor, therefore, 
MERGER is expected to be positively associated with turnover. Similarly, firms with 
other major changes are also expected to change auditors more often, so 
RESTRUCTURE, DISCOPS, and CFVOL are expected to be positively associated with 
auditor turnover.  
More complicated or difficult audits are expected to increase auditor turnover. 
Complication and difficulty are measured by RECINV, GEOSEG, BUSSEG, FOREIGN, 
EXTRA, SPECIAL, RESTATE, and MISSTATE. Audits with internal control 
weaknesses are also expected to increase auditor turnover, so MATWEAK is expected to 
be positively associated with turnover. 








Internal control weaknesses. 
Increased audit effort is also associated with increased reporting of material 
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (Rice & Weber, 2012). SOX 
requires auditors of publicly traded companies to give an opinion on the effectiveness of 
internal controls over financial reporting and to disclose material weaknesses in internal 
controls under Section 404 (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial 
Services, 2002). The increased efforts of the auditors of companies owned by hedge 
funds, therefore, are expected to increase the reporting of material weaknesses under 
Section 404. 
To test the effect of hedge fund ownership on internal control weakness, I use the 
following regression based on Ge, Koester, and McVay (2017): 
MATWEAKt = β0 + β1(HF_OWNEDt-1 or HF_NUMt-1) + β2SIZEt-1 + β3GEOSEGt-1 + 
β4BUSSEGt-1 + β5RESTATEt-1 + β6AGEt-1 + β7INST_OWNEDt-1 + β8CASHt-1 + 
β9PRIORWEAKt + β10AGG_LOSSt-1,t + YEAR and INDUSTRY DUMMIES + εit                 
The control variables for MATWEAK and their associated directions have been 
documented by prior research (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & Lafond, 2009; 
Doyle, Ge, & McVay, 2007; Ge et al., 2017; Ge & McVay, 2005). A firm’s financial 
condition has been shown to affect internal controls. AGGLOSS is defined as 1 if a firm 
incurs an aggregate loss across years t-1 and t and is expected to increase MATWEAK. 





expected to decrease MATWEAK. SIZE and AGE are also expected to decrease material 
weaknesses in internal control.  
Having previously reported weaknesses in internal control increases the 
likelihood of material weaknesses at time t. PRIORWEAK is defined as 1 if a firm had a 
reported material weakness in internal controls in the previous year. The complexity of 
operations and financial reporting quality also increase the likelihood of material 
weaknesses, so GEOSEG, BUSSEG, and RESTATE are expected to increase 
MATWEAK. Being owned by financial institutions has been shown to decrease material 
weaknesses in internal control. INST_OWNED is defined as the mean percentage of 
outstanding shares held by institutional investors.   
All other variables are measured as previously described. I also include industry 
and year fixed effects in the regressions. MATWEAK will be an indicator variable set to 
1 if the firm has a reported material weakness in time t. Both measurements of the 
independent variable of interest are expected to increase MATWEAK. 
For all models previously described, outliers are identified using the Stata 
program “bacon” (Weber, 2010) and removed. Standard errors are clustered by both firm 
and fiscal year. 
Sample Selection 
Sample selection begins with all publicly traded US firms from 2005 to 2017 with 
data available in Compustat Capital IQ. The sample begins in 2005 because it is after 
SOX implementation and is the first year hedge fund information is available from 





Audit Analytics and company financial data from Compustat. I used data from Capital IQ 
to identify companies with hedge fund ownership. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the sample selection process. I start my sample 
selection with 71,554 firm year observations with total asset data available. Due to 
inherent regulatory and institutional differences, I exclude firms in the financial industry 
(SIC 6000-SIC 6999). I eliminate 22,853 firm year observations that were missing data in 
Audit Analytics. Most of these observations were missing internal control opinions data 
in Audit Analytics. The sample was further reduced by 18,564 firm year observations due  
to missing control variables data from Compustat. The final sample comprises 30,047 
firm year observations covering 5,737 individual companies between 2005 and 
2017.Panel B of Table 2 shows the distribution of sample observations by fiscal year. 
Year observations as a percentage of total observations ranged from 10.40% in 2005 
down to 4.61% in 2017, mirroring the decrease in U.S. listed companies since the 1990’s  
(Bloomberg Editorial Board, 2018). The breakdown of industries represented by one-
digit SIC can be found in Panel C of Table 2. The largest industry represented was 
manufacturing, machinery, and electronics at 33.30% of the total population, due not only 
to number of observations, but also to completeness of data, while health, legal, 
educational services, and other was the smallest at 5.81%. 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables 
AUDIT_FEES, LAG, TURNOVERt, and MATWEAKt. The average (median) amount 
firms paid for an audit (AUDIT_FEES) was $899,864.97 ($955,509.51), and the average 







     
Panel A: Sample Selection     
Firm-years in Compustat 2005-2017          71,554  
Firm-years missing Audit Analytics data         (22,853) 
Firm-years missing firm control variables data         (18,564) 
Final Sample          30,047  
      
Total Firms            5,737  
      
Panel B: Sample by Year     
      
Year N % 
2005 3,125 10.40 
2006 2,916 9.70 
2007 2,702 8.99 
2008 2,561 8.52 
2009 2,461 8.19 
2010 2,368 7.88 
2011 2,302 7.66 
2012 2,130 7.09 
2013 2,191 7.29 
2014 2,093 6.97 
2015 1,973 6.57 
2016 1,840 6.12 
2017 1,385 4.61 
Final Sample 30,047 100.00 
      
Panel C: Industry Comparison     
      
Industry (One-Digit SIC) N % 
0-1 (Agriculture, mining, oil and construction) 1,939 6.45 
2 (Food, tobacco, textiles, paper and chemicals) 4,845 16.12 
3 (Manufacturing, machinery and electronics) 10,006 33.30 
4 (Transportation and communications) 3,859 12.84 
5 (Wholesale and retail) 3,242 10.79 
7 (Services) 4,411 14.68 
8-9 (Health, legal, educational services and other) 1,745 5.81 






Descriptive Statistics-Full Sample 
  Mean Median S.D. Q1 Q3 N 
Dependent Variables           
LAG 4.21 4.19 0.28 4.04 4.32        29,530  
AUDIT_FEES 13.71 13.77 1.31 12.84 14.57        29,035  
TURNOVERt 0.08 0 0.27 0 0        30,047  
MATWEAKt 0.05 0 0.21 0 0        29,390  
Test Variables           
HF_NUM 0.20 0 0.53 0 0        30,047  
HF_OWNED 1.95 0 5.97 0 0        30,047  
Audit Control Variables         
BIG4 0.70 1 0.46 0 1        30,047  
BUSY 0.66 1 0.47 0 1        30,047  
MATWEAKt-1 0.05 0 0.23 0 0        30,047  
PRIORWEAK 0.04 0 0.2 0 0        30,047  
TURNOVERt-1 0.08 0 0.27 0 0        30,047  
Firm Control Variables         
AGE 23.49 18 15.6 11 32        30,047  
AGGLOSS 0.32 0 0.47 0 1        30,047  
BUSSEG 2.28 2.1 0.84 2.1 2.95        30,047  
CASH 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.04 0.3        30,047  
CFVOL 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.08        30,047  
DISCOPS 0.18 0 0.39 0 0        30,047  
EXTRA 0.01 0 0.11 0 0        30,047  
FOREIGN 0.50 0 0.5 0 1        30,047  
GEOSEG 1.84 1.69 0.76 1 2.39        30,047  
INST_OWNED 38.16 28.91 37.21 0 76.58        30,047  
LEVERAGE 0.47 0.47 0.22 0.29 0.63        30,047  
ΔLEVERAGE 0.06 -0.99 0.4 -0.08 0.11        30,047  
LOSS 0.31 0 0.46 0 1        30,047  
MERGER 0.18 0 0.39 0 0        30,047  
MISTATE 0.11 0 0.31 0 0        30,047  
RECINV 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.11 0.38        30,047  
RESTATE 0.13 0 0.33 0 0        30,047  
RESTRUCTURE 0.31 0 0.46 0 1        30,047  
ROA -0.02 0.04 0.25 -0.03 0.08        30,047  
SIZE 6.06 6.03 2.19 4.51 7.58        30,047  






(LAG) was 67. Approximately eight percent of firm year observations changed auditors 
from the previous fiscal year (TURNOVER) and approximately five percent of firm years 
reported an internal control material weakness (MATWEAKt). 
The number of hedge funds averaged 0.20 (HF_NUM) and they owned nearly 
two percent of outstanding shares (HF_OWNED). The Big 4 accounting firms (BIG4) 
audited approximately 70% of the observations with eight percent changing auditors from 
one fiscal year to the next (TURNOVERt-1). Approximately 66% of firms had a fiscal 
year end of December 31 (BUSY).The average length of time firms have been listed in 
Compustat was 23.498 years (AGE) while total assets averaged $157,000,000 (SIZE). 
Institutions owned 38.16% of stock outstanding on average (INST_OWNED). Nearly 
one-third (31%) of firms reported a loss during the fiscal year (LOSS) and 32% 
experienced an aggregate loss over the current and previous fiscal years (AGGLOSS). 
Cash and cash equivalents totaled 20% of total assets (CASH) with firms reporting 
average cash flow volatility over the previous five fiscal years of 0.08 (CFVOL). The 
average return on assets was -0.02 (ROA) while the average receivables to inventory ratio 
was 26% (RECINV). Total liabilities as a percentage of total assets averaged 47% 
(LEVERAGE) while the change in leverage from the previous fiscal year to the current 
was 0.06 (ΔLEVERAGE).  
Approximately 18% of firm years reported a merger (MERGER) and 31% 
underwent restructuring (RESTRUCTURE), while 18% reported discontinued operations 
(DISCOPS). One-half of firm years had sales outside the United States (FOREIGN) with 
                                                          
8 Average age of original observations of 71,554 is 19 years, indicating my sample may be biased towards 





an average of 2.32 geographic segments (GEOSEG) and 3.6 business segments 
(BUSSEG). Just over two-thirds (67%) of firm years reported special items (SPECIAL) 
and one percent reported extraordinary items (EXTRA). Eleven percent of year 
observations contained a misstatement (MISTATE), while 13% had financial statements 
restated at a later date (RESTATE).  
 My tests for Hypothesis 3 are limited to financially distressed firms, which, 
consistent with prior research (Carson et al., 2013) are companies that report either a net 
loss or negative cash flows in the fiscal year. This sample is a subset of the primary 
sample and consists of 13,854 firm year observations. Table 4 reports the descriptive 
statistics for the dependent variable FIRSTGCO. Approximately six percent  of firm year 
observations reported a first time going concern opinion (FIRSTGCO). 
The subset of financially distressed firms had higher average hedge fund 
ownership (HF_NUM= 0.29 and HF_OWNED= 2.91), the Big 4 accounting firms 
audited fewer (BIG4= 0.54), and audit lag was higher (LAG= 76) than the main sample. 
As expected, firms on average had a relatively low Altman Zscore (ZSCORE= 2.43), 
negative stock returns of approximately fifteen percent (STOCK_RETURN), and 
negative operating cash flows (OCF= -0.12), however, the firms, on average, had a 
healthy acid test ratio (LIQUIDITY= 3.52) and sales growth (GROWTH= 1.88). 
Compared to the main sample of firms, the financially distressed firms were smaller 
(SIZE= 4.74) and younger (AGE= 16.33) with a similar amount of leverage 
(LEVERAGE= 0.47), but a higher change in leverage from the previous fiscal year 
(ΔLEVERAGE= 0.21).  Firm investments made up just over a third of total assets 






Descriptive Statistics-Financially Distressed Firms 
  Mean Median S.D. Q1 Q3 N 
Dependent Variables           
FIRSTGCO 0.06 0.24 0 0 0   12,294  
Test Variables             
HF_NUM 0.29 0.65 0 0 0   12,294  
HF_OWNED 2.91 7.63 0 0 0   12,294  
Audit Control Variables           
BIG4 0.54 0.50 1 0 1   12,294  
LAG 4.33 0.30 4.32 4.13 4.49   12,294  
Firm Control Variables           
AGE 16.33 12.54 13.00 7.00 21.00   12,294  
GROWTH 1.88 58.08 0.02 0.14 0.24   12,294  
INVESTMENT 0.36 0.41 0.2 0.05 0.55   12,294  
LEVERAGE 0.47 0.25 0.46 0.27 0.66   12,294  
LIQUIDITY 3.52 6.21 2.14 1.34 3.83   12,294  
LOSS 0.91 0.29 1 1 1   12,294  
NEW_FINANCE 0.42 0.49 0 0 1   12,294  
OCF -0.12 0.34 -0.02 0.16 0.05   12,294  
SIZE 4.74 2.11 4.61 3.26 6.08   12,294  
STOCK_RETURN -0.15 0.42 -0.19 -0.47 0.12   12,294  
ZSCORE 2.43 21.31 2.07 0.05 4.00   12,294  







financing during the fiscal year (NEW_FINANCE= 0.42). 
Correlations 
Table 5 contains the Pearson correlation matrix for all variables used in the main 
regressions for Hypotheses 1 through 4. Correlations with a significance at or below five 
percent are highlighted in bold. Correlations above 0.80 would suggest multicollinearity 
may be a problem (Kennedy, 2008). There are numerous significant correlations, 
however, only one correlation is large enough to raise concerns of multicollinearity. 
There is a correlation of 0.86 between the number of hedge funds (HF_NUM) and the 
total ownership by hedge funds (HF_OWNED). This concern is mitigated, however, 
because no regressions were performed with both of these variables included. LOSS and 
AGGLOSS had a correlation of 0.781, which is reasonable given that a loss in one fiscal 
year is likely to be correlated to an overall loss in a two-year period. All other 
correlations are below the threshold of 0.80. In addition, variance inflation factors (VIF) 
were used to assess the magnitude of multi-collinearity and ranged from 1.02 to 2.889. 
These factors are well below the recommended score of 10 (Kennedy, 2008). 
                                                          
9 VIF were calculated on the audit fees and audit lag models only. The audit fees and lag models used OLS 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Results of Hypothesis 1 
Table 6 reports the results of the regression model for Hypothesis 1, where the 
dependent variable was audit lag (LAG) and was executed as an OLS regression.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that there is no association between the number of hedge or the 
percentage ownership of hedge funds and audit lag. The results indicate, however, that 
there is a negative, significant relationship between audit lag and the number of hedge 
fund owners (coef. -0.009; p=0.002) at the 1% level and the percentage of hedge fund 
ownership (coef. -0.000; p=0.058) at the 10% level. Coefficients for fiscal year and 
industry variables are included in the regression models but not reported in the tables to 
conserve space10. The null of Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, rejected. This finding indicates 
that firms with hedge funds as owners have shorter lag time between the issuance of the 
audit report and the balance sheet date.  This suggests that auditors are more efficient in 
their audit and that hedge fund ownership does not appear to increase risk for auditors. 
This supports the viewpoint that external auditors consider hedge fund ownership of 
clients to decrease audit engagement risk.  
                                                          
10 As robustness tests, the models were also run with standard errors clustered by firm and clustered by both 






Test of Hypothesis 1: Audit Lag and Hedge Fund Ownership 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Outliers have been removed. Firm and industry fixed 
effects are included but not tabulated. 
  
Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value
HF_NUM ? -0.009 -3.13 0.002 ***
HF_OWNED ? 0.000 -1.9 0.058 *
SIZE - -0.059 -60.01 0.000 *** -0.059 -59.89 0.000 ***
LEVERAGE + 0.000 0.85 0.394 0.000 0.87 0.385
ΔLEVERAGE + 0.001 2.73 0.006 *** 0.001 2.72 0.006 ***
RECINV + 0.062 6.59 0.000 *** 0.062 6.58 0.000 ***
ROA - 0.000 -2.34 0.019 ** 0.000 -2.35 0.019 **
LOSS + 0.061 18.26 0.000 *** 0.061 18.17 0.000 ***
GEOSEG + -0.001 -0.56 0.572 -0.001 -0.57 0.569
BUSSEG + 0.006 2.64 0.008 *** 0.006 2.64 0.008 ***
CFVOL + 0.002 1.6 0.111 0.002 1.63 0.103
FOREIGN + -0.010 -2.37 0.018 ** -0.009 -2.35 0.019 **
MERGER + 0.002 0.44 0.661 0.002 0.45 0.652
RESTRUCTURE + -0.008 -2.14 0.033 ** -0.008 -2.17 0.030 **
DISCOPS + 0.007 1.93 0.053 * 0.007 1.9 0.057 *
EXTRA + 0.008 0.62 0.533 0.008 0.62 0.533
SPECIAL + 0.021 6.15 0.000 *** 0.021 6.11 0.000 ***
BIG4 - -0.057 -14.1 0.000 *** -0.057 -14.16 0.000 ***
BUSY - -0.011 -3.33 0.001 *** -0.011 -3.36 0.001 ***
MATWEAK + 0.085 13.32 0.000 *** 0.085 13.3 0.000 ***
RESTATE + 0.005 1.07 0.028 ** 0.005 1.05 0.029 **
MISTATE + 0.093 20.58 0.000 *** 0.093 20.59 0.000 ***
TURNOVER + 0.019 3.61 0.000 *** 0.019 3.62 0.000 ***
Intercept 4.743 236.92 0.000 *** 4.742 3.62 0.000 ***
Years Included Included
Indutries Included Included




F-statistic 213 *** 212.89 ***
*, **, *** Denote significance at the p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 levels, respect ively.








Control variables for the LAG model are significant with the exceptions of 
GEOSEG (p=0.572 and 0.569), CFVOL (p=0.111 and 0.103), MERGER (p=0.661 and 
0.652), and EXTRA (p=0.533 and 0.533). Directions of coefficients of control variables 
are consistent with prior literature in direction of association, except for GEOSEG, 
FOREIGN, and RESTRUCTURE.  
Results of Hypothesis 2 
Table 7 reports the results of the regression model for Hypothesis 2, where the 
dependent variable was audit fees (AUDIT_FEES) and was executed as an OLS 
regression.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that there is no association between the number of hedge 
funds or the percentage ownership of hedge funds and audit fees. The results indicate, 
however, that there is a positive, significant relationship between audit fees and the 
number of hedge fund owners (coef. 0.027; p<0.001) and the percentage of hedge fund 
ownership (coef. 0.002; p<0.001). The null of Hypothesis 2 is, therefore, rejected. This 
finding indicates that firms with hedge funds as owners incur higher audit fees. This 
supports the viewpoint that external auditors consider hedge fund ownership of clients to 
increase auditor engagement risk and that audit firms are charging a risk premium to 
clients with hedge fund owners, thereby increasing the cost of the audit. Taken together 
with the findings from Hypothesis 1, the results suggest that hedge fund ownership 
increases the amount charged by auditors per audit, but decreases the length of time spent 
on an audit. One possibility is that audit firms are putting more and/or higher level 






Test of Hypothesis 2: Audit Fees and Hedge Fund Ownership 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Outliers have been removed. Firm and industry fixed 
effects are included but not tabulated. 
  
Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value
HF_NUM ? 0.027 4.69 0.000 ***
HF_OWNED ? 0.002 4.42 0.000 ***
SIZE + 0.450 217.04 0.000 *** 0.450 216.99 0.000 ***
LEVERAGE + 0.001 9.12 0.000 *** 0.001 9.12 0.000 ***
ΔLEVERAGE + 0.009 7.05 0.000 *** 0.009 7.05 0.000 ***
RECINV + 0.295 14.95 0.000 *** 0.295 14.92 0.000 ***
ROA - 0.000 1.07 0.284 0.000 1.07 0.286
LOSS + 0.128 17.93 0.000 *** 0.128 17.95 0.000 ***
GEOSEG + 0.125 22.54 0.000 *** 0.125 22.56 0.000 ***
BUSSEG + 0.094 20.1 0.000 *** 0.094 20.06 0.000 ***
CFVOL + 0.033 13.54 0.000 *** 0.033 13.52 0.000 ***
FOREIGN + 0.224 26.44 0.000 *** 0.224 26.43 0.000 ***
MERGER + 0.039 4.51 0.000 *** 0.039 4.52 0.000 ***
RESTRUCTURE + 0.096 12.45 0.000 *** 0.096 12.46 0.000 ***
DISCOPS + 0.114 14.47 0.000 *** 0.114 14.49 0.000 ***
EXTRA + 0.068 2.52 0.012 ** 0.068 2.53 0.011 **
SPECIAL + 0.085 11.45 0.000 *** 0.085 11.48 0.000 ***
BIG4 + 0.337 39.42 0.000 *** 0.338 39.48 0.000 ***
BUSY + 0.049 7.3 0.000 *** 0.049 7.32 0.000 ***
MATWEAK + 0.338 25.13 0.000 *** 0.338 25.16 0.000 ***
RESTATE + 0.048 5.3 0.000 *** 0.048 5.33 0.000 ***
MISTATE + 0.073 7.65 0.000 *** 0.073 7.64 0.000 ***
TURNOVER + -0.023 -2.06 0.039 * -0.023 -2.09 0.037 *
Intercept 9.588 226.62 0.000 *** 9.588 226.65 0.000 ***
Years Included Included
Industries Included Included




F-statistic 2027.16 *** 2026.96 ***
*, **, *** Denote significance at the p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 levels, respect ively.








charged by increasing the number of hours spent, but could cause the audit to be finished 
more quickly. Another possibility is that auditors are spending more overtime on clients 
with hedge fund owners with the same results as above. I have conducted an additional 
analysis of the interaction between hedge funds, audit lag, and audit fees in the next 
section to investigate the potential reason for higher audit fees. 
 Control variables for the AUDIT_FEES model are significant with the with the 
exception of ROA (p=0.284 and 0.286), most likely due to the significance of the 
variable LOSS in the model. Directions of coefficients of control variables are consistent 
with prior literature in direction of association, except for auditor change (TURNOVER) . 
Additional analysis of effort versus risk premium on audit fees 
 To investigate whether auditors are responding to hedge funds by instituting a risk 
premium or expending greater effort, I examined how hedge funds and effort interact in 
relation to audit fees. Because audit lag is a common proxy for audit effort, I created an 
interaction term between hedge fund ownership and audit lag. If the interaction term has 
a positive (negative) association with audit fees, then there is evidence to suggest that 
auditors expend more (less) effort when hedge funds are present. 
 The results of this additional analysis can be found in Table 8. As can be seen 
from the results, the interaction of hedge fund ownership and audit lag (HF_NUM*LAG 
and HF_OWN*LAG) is positive and significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, by adding 
the interaction term, the association between hedge funds and audit fees is now negative 
and significant at the 10% level. These results indicate having hedge funds as owners 






Additional Analysis: Effort Versus Risk Premium 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Outliers have been removed. Firm and industry fixed 
effects are included but not tabulated. 
  
Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value
HF_NUM ? -0.170 -1.8 0.071 *
HF_OWNED ? -0.015 -1.87 0.062 *
LAG ? 0.049 3.76 0.000 *** 0.050 3.82 0.000 ***
HF_NUM*LAG ? 0.046 2.1 0.036 **
HF_OWN*LAG ? 0.004 2.16 0.031 **
SIZE + 0.453 206.79 0.000 *** 0.453 206.85 0.000 ***
LEVERAGE + 0.001 9.19 0.000 *** 0.001 9.19 0.000 ***
ΔLEVERAGE + 0.009 6.97 0.000 *** 0.009 6.98 0.000 ***
RECINV + 0.290 14.74 0.000 *** 0.290 14.74 0.000 ***
ROA - 0.000 -1.02 0.309 0.000 -1.01 0.313
LOSS + 0.128 18.02 0.000 *** 0.129 18.07 0.000 ***
GEOSEG + 0.124 22.34 0.000 *** 0.124 22.36 0.000 ***
BUSSEG + 0.093 19.96 0.000 *** 0.093 19.92 0.000 ***
CFVOL + 0.033 13.5 0.000 *** 0.033 13.47 0.000 ***
FOREIGN + 0.228 27.04 0.000 *** 0.228 27.03 0.000 ***
MERGER + 0.033 3.85 0.000 *** 0.033 3.84 0.000 ***
RESTRUCTURE + 0.095 12.42 0.000 *** 0.095 12.42 0.000 ***
DISCOPS + 0.117 14.9 0.000 *** 0.117 14.91 0.000 ***
EXTRA + 0.065 2.42 0.015 ** 0.065 2.42 0.015 **
SPECIAL + 0.086 11.63 0.000 *** 0.086 11.67 0.000 ***
BIG4 + 0.341 39.79 0.000 *** 0.341 39.85 0.000 ***
BUSY + 0.052 7.9 0.000 *** 0.053 7.92 0.000 ***
MATWEAK + 0.402 27.48 0.000 *** 0.404 27.57 0.000 ***
RESTATE + 0.055 6.08 0.000 *** 0.055 6.11 0.000 ***
MISTATE + 0.048 5.02 0.000 *** 0.048 5.01 0.000 ***
TURNOVER + -0.014 -1.24 0.213 -0.014 -1.27 0.206
Intercept 9.333 124.84 0.000 *** 9.333 125.55 0.000 ***
Years Included Included
Industries Included Included




F-statistic 2001.60 *** 2001.52 ***
*, **, *** Denote significance at the p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 levels, respect ively.








higher audit fees suggesting that hedge funds are willing to pay higher fees for audits. 
This is consistent with the concept that audit fees are a function of demand and that well 
informed, independent governance demands higher audit quality (Hay et al., 2006).  
Results of Hypothesis 3 
 Table 9 reports the results of the regression model for Hypothesis 3, where the 
dependent variable was issuance of a first going concern opinion (FIRSTGCO) and was 
executed as a PROBIT regression. Following Carson et al. (2013), I restrict the sample to 
financially distressed firms with negative net income or operating cash flow. The 
regression for the test variable of HF_NUM was statically significant with a chi-squared 
of 1516.60 and a pseudo R2 of 0.262 (p<0.001), consistent with prior literature (Krishnan 
and Yang 2009). The regression for the test variable of HF_OWNED was also statically 
significant with a chi-squared of 1521.64 and a pseudo R2 of 0.263 (p<0.001). The areas 
under ROC are 0.872 and 0.873 for HF_NUM and HF_OWNED, respectively, which 
means my model does well at predicting the issuance of a first going concern opinion 
(Hosemer & Lemeshow, 2013). Hypothesis 3 predicted that there is no association 
between the number of hedge funds or the percentage ownership of hedge funds and the  
issuance of a first going concern opinion. The results indicate that there is no significant 
relationship between a first going concern opinion and the number of hedge fund owners  
(coef. -0.042; p=0.340) and the percentage of hedge fund ownership (coef. -0.003; 
p=0.305). The results, therefore, fail to provide support for rejecting the null of 
Hypothesis 3. The results of Hypothesis 3 indicate that auditors do not perceive hedge 
fund ownership to affect auditor engagement risk. 






Test of Hypothesis 3: First Going Concern Opinion and Hedge Fund Ownership 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Outliers have been removed. Firm and industry fixed 
effects are included but not tabulated. 
  
Coef. z-stat p-value Coef. z-stat p-value
HF_NUM ? -0.042 -0.95 0.340
HF_OWNED ? -0.003 -1.03 0.305
SIZE - -0.196 -11.94 0.000 *** -0.197 -11.99 0.000 ***
AGE - -0.011 -4.78 0.000 *** -0.011 -4.79 0.000 ***
BIG4 - 0.040 0.7 0.487 0.039 0.67 0.500
LEVERAGE + 0.597 5.83 0.000 *** 0.597 5.82 0.000 ***
ΔLEVERAGE + -0.013 -0.89 0.371 -0.013 -0.9 0.366
ZSCORE - -0.349 -1.7 0.090 * -0.665 -1.7 0.088 *
OCF - -0.504 -9.96 0.000 *** -0.507 -10.02 0.000 ***
LAG + 0.557 8.91 0.000 *** 0.557 8.89 0.000 ***
LIQUIDITY - -0.032 -3.69 0.000 *** -0.033 -3.71 0.000 ***
LOSS + 0.367 3.87 0.000 *** 0.366 3.87 0.000 ***
STOCK_RETURN - -0.631 -10.81 0.000 *** -0.632 -10.83 0.000 ***
GROWTH - 0.000 2.01 0.044 ** 0.000 2.01 0.044 **
INVESTMENT - -0.338 -4.22 0.000 *** -0.341 -4.26 0.000 ***
NEW_FINANCE + 0.094 1.94 0.052 * 0.093 1.92 0.055 *
Intercept -2.856 -5.97 0.000 *** -2.847 -5.95 0.000 ***
Years Included Included
Industries Included Included
Observations 12,294 12,294  




Area under ROC 0.872 0.873
*, **, *** Denote significance at the p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 levels, respect ively.








directions of coefficients with prior literature (Blay, Geiger, & North, 2011) with a few 
exceptions. All control variables were significant with the with the exception of BIG4 
(p=0.487 and 0.500) and ΔLEVERAGE (p=0.371 and 0.366).  Directions of coefficients 
of control variables are consistent, except for BIG4, ΔLEVERAGE, and GROWTH. 
Results of Testing Hypothesis 4 
 Table 10 reports the results of the regression model for Hypothesis 4, where the 
dependent variable was a change in auditor (TURNOVER) and was executed as a 
PROBIT regression. The regression for the test variable of HF_NUM was statically 
significant with a chi-squared of 1,823 and a pseudo R2 of 0.106 (p<0.001), consistent 
with prior literature (Krishnan and Yang 2009). The regression for the test variable of 
HF_OWNED was also statically significant with a chi-squared of 1,824 and a pseudo R2 
of 0.106 (p<0.001). The areas under ROC are 0.749 and 0.751 for HF_NUM and 
HF_OWNED, respectively, which means my model does fairly well at explaining auditor 
turnover (Hosemer & Lemeshow, 2013). Hypothesis 4 predicted that there is no 
association between the number of hedge funds or the percentage ownership of hedge 
funds and auditor turnover. The results indicate that there is no significant relationship 
between auditor turnover and the number of hedge fund owners (coef. 0.005; p=0.80) and 
the percentage of hedge fund ownership (coef. 0.0001; p=0.317). The null of Hypothesis 
4 is, therefore, not rejected11. The results of Hypothesis 4 indicate that auditors do not 
perceive hedge fund ownership to affect auditor engagement risk, however, it should be 
noted that auditor resignation is an extreme reaction to engagement risk. 
                                                          
11 As a robustness test, the auditor turnover model was run controlling for audit fees with similar results, 






Test of Hypothesis 4: Auditor Turnover and Hedge Fund Ownership 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Outliers have been removed. Firm and industry fixed 
effects are included but not tabulated. 
 
  
Coef. z-stat p-value Coef. z-stat p-value
HF_NUM ? 0.005 0.25 0.800
HF_OWNED ? 0.002 1 0.317
SIZE - -0.057 -7.43 0.000 *** -0.057 -7.37 0.000 ***
LEVERAGE + 0.000 -1.12 0.026 ** 0.000 -1.1 0.027 **
RECINV + 0.021 0.31 0.075 * 0.020 0.29 0.077 *
ROA - 0.001 1.19 0.232 0.001 1.19 0.234
LOSS + 0.071 2.73 0.006 ** 0.070 2.69 0.007 **
GEOSEG + 0.043 2.13 0.033 ** 0.044 2.13 0.033 **
BUSSEG + 0.024 1.33 0.182 0.024 1.31 0.189
CFVOL + 0.012 2.24 0.025 ** 0.012 2.24 0.025 **
FOREIGN + -0.005 -0.15 0.883 -0.004 -0.13 0.894
MERGER + 0.014 -0.39 0.069 * 0.013 -0.37 0.071 *
RESTRUCTURE + 0.053 -1.72 0.086 * 0.053 -1.73 0.083 *
DISCOPS + 0.063 2.09 0.037 ** 0.063 2.07 0.039 **
EXTRA + -0.041 -0.4 0.692 -0.041 -0.39 0.693
SPECIAL + 0.065 2.39 0.017 ** 0.064 2.38 0.017 **
BIG4 - -0.676 -22.77 0.000 *** -0.676 -22.78 0.000 ***
BUSY + 0.005 0.22 0.829 0.005 0.21 0.832
MATWEAK + 0.348 7.85 0.0000 *** 0.349 7.86 0.000 ***
RESTATE + 0.042 1.26 0.021 ** 0.042 1.26 0.021 **
MISTATE + 0.005 0.14 0.089 * 0.005 0.15 0.088 *
Intercept -0.446 -2.06 0.039 * -0.448 -2.07 0.038 *
Years Included Included
Industries Included Included
Observations 30,047  30,047  




Area under ROC 0.749 0.751
*, **, *** Denote significance at the p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 levels, respect ively.








Control variables for the TURNOVER model are significant with the exceptions 
of ROA (p=0.232 and 0.234), BUSSEG (p=0.182 and 0.189), FOREIGN (p=0.883 and 
0.894), EXTRA (p=0.692 and 0.693), and BUSY (p=0.829 and 0.832). Directions of 
coefficients of control variables are consistent with prior literature in direction of 
association, except for ROA, FOREIGN, and EXTRA. 
Results of Additional Analysis 
 Table 11 reports the results of the regression model for the additional analysis, 
where the dependent variable was MATWEAK and was executed as a probit regression. 
The regression for the test variable of HF_NUM was statically significant with a chi-
squared of 991.6 and a pseudo R2 of 0.189 (p<0.001), consistent with prior literature 
(Krishnan and Yang 2009). The regression for the test variable of HF_OWNED was also 
statically significant with a chi-squared of 992.92 and a pseudo R2 of 0.19 (p<0.001). The 
areas under ROC are 0.763 and 0.765 for HF_NUM and HF_OWNED, respectively, 
which means my model does fairly well at predicting the issuance of a first going concern 
opinion (Hosemer & Lemeshow, 2013). The additional analysis investigated whether or 
not the number of hedge or the percentage ownership of hedge funds is associated with 
the issuance of material weaknesses in internal control. The results indicate that there is 
no significant relationship between the issuance of material weaknesses and the number 
of hedge fund owners (coef. 0.009; p=0.741) and the percentage of hedge fund ownership 
(coef. -0.003; p=0.24). The results of the additional analysis indicate that the propensity 
to issue material control weakness is not associated with hedge fund ownership. 






Test of Additional Analysis: Material Weaknesses and Hedge Fund Ownership 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Outliers have been removed. Firm and industry fixed 
effects are included but not tabulated.
 
  
Coef. z-stat p-value Coef. z-stat p-value
HF_NUM ? 0.009 0.33 0.741
HF_OWNED ? -0.003 -1.17 0.240
SIZE - 0.037 4.36 0.000 *** 0.035 4.18 0.000 ***
GEOSEG + 0.147 6.92 0.000 *** 0.147 6.89 0.000 ***
BUSSEG + 0.056 2.57 0.010 ** 0.057 2.62 0.009 **
RESTATE + 0.122 3.21 0.001 *** 0.122 3.21 0.001 ***
AGE - -0.007 -6.57 0.000 *** -0.007 -6.62 0.000 ***
INST_OWNED - -0.002 -3.4 0.001 *** -0.001 -3.18 0.001 ***
CASH - -0.096 -1.31 0.191 -0.095 -1.3 0.194
PRIORWEAK + 0.773 16.09 0.000 *** 0.775 16.14 0.000 ***
AGGLOSS + 0.121 3.95 0.000 *** 0.125 4.08 0.000 ***
Intercept -2.150 -12.69 0.000 *** -2.131 -12.56 0.000 ***
Years Included Included
Industries Included Included
Observations 29,390  29,390  




Area under ROC 0.763 0.765
*, **, *** Denote significance at the p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01 levels, respectively.








exception of CASH (p=0.191 and 0.194). Directions of coefficients of control variables 









The rapid rise of hedge fund activism over the last twenty years has given rise to 
concerns about the effects of hedge funds on publicly traded companies, stakeholders, 
and the U. S. economy (Coffee Jr. & Palia, 2016).  The main concern is that hedge funds 
focus on shifting funds out of long-term spending and into distributions to shareholders 
(Monga et al., 2015; Sharfman, 2015).  Proponents, however, contend that hedge funds 
push management into taking strategic actions to aid performance, counter passive 
investors (Liou, 2018) and decrease a firm’s agency problems (Christie, 2018). 
Academic research supports the contention that hedge fund activism can lead to 
favorable outcomes for companies. Studies by Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015) and 
Goodwin, Singh, Slipetz, and Rao (2014) found no evidence that positive returns from 
hedge fund activism reversed themselves after intervention, suggesting long term 
improvements in firm performance. Sharfman (2015) contends that hedge funds create 
value by providing Boards with an alternate viewpoint from management for decision 
making. Further research provides evidence that hedge fund intervention improves 
operating performance (Clifford, 2008) and debt restructuring in financially distressed 
firms (Lim, 2015).  
In this study, I investigate the effect of hedge fund ownership on the audit 





affects auditor-client contracting. Performing audits creates risk for the external auditor 
(DeFond et al., 2016; Knechel & Vanstraelen, 2007). There is the risk of giving an 
incorrect audit opinion, the risk of client insolvency, and the risk of loss, both through 
loss of reputation and from litigation (DeFond et al., 2016). If external auditors consider 
hedge fund ownership to increase risk , they will take measures to decrease the risk 
(DeFond & Zhang, 2014).  
I find no evidence consistent with this notion.  However, When examining the 
impact of hedge fund ownership and audit lag, the results show that firms with hedge 
fund ownership have shorter lag time between the issuance of the audit report and the 
balance sheet date. This result suggests that hedge fund ownership decreases perceived 
audit risk.  
I also find that clients with hedge fund owners pay higher audit fees. There is a 
positive, significant relationship between audit fees and the number of hedge fund owners 
and the percentage of hedge fund ownership. In an additional analysis of audit fees and 
hedge funds, however, I discovered that the increase in audit fees was driven not by the 
presence of hedge funds, but by greater auditor effort. Once effort was included, the 
relationship between audit fees and hedge funds became negative, indicating that hedge 
funds reduce perceived audit risk. These results can be interpreted as hedge funds being 
willing to pay more for higher quality audits.  
Auditors can also reduce risk by lowering the threshold for issuing a going 
concern opinion (Fargher & Jiang, 2008) or by leaving the client (Shu, 2000). My 
research found no association between the issuance of a first going concern opinion and 





between auditor turnover and hedge fund ownership. The results indicate that there is no 
significant relationship between a first going concern opinion nor auditor turnover and 
the number of hedge fund owners and the percentage of hedge fund ownership. The 
results indicate that auditors do not perceive hedge fund ownership to affect auditor 
engagement risk. 
For an additional analysis, the study examined the relationship between hedge 
fund ownership and the likelihood of internal control material weakness. The results 
indicate that there is no significant relationship between the issuance of material 
weaknesses and hedge fund ownership.  
One potential area for future research is the relationship between hedge fund 
ownership and non-audit services. Beck and Wu’s (2006) study suggests that NAS can 
either increase or decrease auditor engagement risk, depending on the amount of NAS 
charged to clients. They posit that lower NAS fees are a result of auditor perceived 
reduction in risk and, therefore, an increase in audit quality. This research has shown that 
hedge fund ownership is associated with higher audit fees, but has not explored any 
relationship with other fees paid by audit clients.  
There are potential limitations to the study that must be considered. First, the 
sample consists of only U.S. publicly traded firms with data gathered from public data 
sources. As such, the results may not be generalizable to smaller firms, private firms, or 
firms located outside the U.S. Second, there may be missing or incomplete data due to the 
use of archival data from secondary sources. The average age of the firms in my sample 





testing is biased towards more mature firms and may not be generalizable to younger 
firms. Finally, the study may suffer from unobservable and potentially omitted variables.  
The results of this study add to the growing academic literature on the role of 
hedge funds in the capital markets and their effects on nonfinancial stakeholders. In 
addition, the results will be of interest to politicians, regulators, and business leaders who 
have expressed concerns about the effects of hedge fund involvement in publicly traded 
companies. Likewise, hedge fund managers, certain business leaders, and other 
proponents of hedge fund activism will be interested in the effect of hedge fund 
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